The early months of 2024 saw the fortress of Avdiivka fall, dealing a strong blow to Ukrainian morale and boosting Russian spirits. However, overall, the conflict is unlikely to be resolved this year, according to analysts.

“Nga đang tiến lên một chút nhưng sẽ không dẫn đến sự đột phá lớn” – Robert English, Director of the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California and former policy analyst at the Pentagon, told Dân trí. “Russia may gain more territory, but Ukraine will establish new defensive lines and Russia will slow down to recover. Therefore, I believe the front lines will not change significantly this year.”

However, the conflict in Ukraine is not only prolonged due to slow developments on the battlefield. Another reason is that neither side has clear and mutually acceptable political goals.

“It is difficult for them to engage in peace negotiations because both sides are committed to pursuing maximalist goals,” English pointed out.

The goal Ukraine declared – restoring full sovereignty, including Crimea which Russia annexed in 2014 – is the clearest but hard to achieve, especially as Western support fluctuates.

The West also needs to consider the escalation risk if Ukraine truly regains control of Crimea. Russian officials like Deputy National Security Advisor and former President Dmitry Medvedev have warned of the possibility of nuclear war if that scenario comes to pass.

Russia’s declared goals – demilitarization, non-militarization, and neutrality of Ukraine – offer flexibility and may change depending on the situation on the battlefield. But more importantly, both Kiev and the West seem to believe that any agreement at this point is just a temporary pause for Moscow to eventually overpower Ukraine.

On the Western front, led by the US, President Joe Biden has stated that the aim of assistance is to help Ukraine have the strongest possible position when it comes to final negotiations.

However, such an opportunity was lost with the failure of the summer counteroffensive in 2023, when Kiev had access to a large amount of Western-supplied weapons. It will take Ukraine some time to rebuild its forces to carry out new operations.

Therefore, without a breakthrough on the battlefield, Ukraine will not be ready to sit at the negotiating table, and Russia will consider that unnecessary.

“I don’t see any negotiations happening soon,” Fyodor Lukyanov, head of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy based in Moscow, told AFP. “There is nothing for both sides to negotiate.”

A crucial moment will come after the US presidential election in November.

According to English, if Trump wins, the US will likely send a tough message to Ukraine: It’s time for peace, no more military aid. If Biden wins, the White House will have more political leeway to push Ukraine to negotiate, if the president desires.

Both on the battlefield and in terms of defense production, Russia holds an advantage. But that doesn’t mean there are no concerns.

“After promising to win in Kiev, the Kremlin will find it hard to accept a ceasefire with the current frontlines, even though they are capable of doing so,” English said.

Russia’s economy may be “rosy,” but the driving force behind growth is defense spending, while social spending is neglected. This could create long-term problems. And although Russia currently has sufficient manpower, long-term human losses could cause difficulties, according to English.

“In the end, public opposition will increase, so the Kremlin cannot maintain this for long. But they seem to be able to endure longer than Ukraine,” English assessed.

Experts agree that in 2024, the conflict in Ukraine will continue and may even intensify.

However, while many believe that Ukraine’s long-term exhaustion against Russia is inevitable, some observers like Michael Clarke of the Royal United Services Institute and a visiting professor at King’s College London, do not agree.

Clarke pointed out that the future of the conflict in 2025-2026 will be determined by four fronts this year.

The first front is on land. With limited troops and resources, Kiev may have to accept losing some territory along the frontlines this year. After the success at Avdiivka, Russia may continue to advance to Kupyansk further north.

Ukraine will try to reinforce defensive lines in the south and west, especially around Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, to prevent Russia from capturing the entire Donbas region.

The second front is in the Black Sea. Facing Ukraine’s suicide boat attacks, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet has left its base in Sevastopol, helping Kiev open up trade routes to the Danube basin and the Mediterranean.

“Most significantly, Ukraine’s success in threatening Russia’s position in Crimea has provided the country with a strategic leverage against Moscow,” Clarke said.

The third front is the air battle: Russia’s air dominance prevented Ukraine’s summer 2023 counteroffensive. Russian weapons like Iskander missiles, Kh-101 cruise missiles, Ka-52 attack helicopters, and FAB-500 heavy bombs pose a significant threat to Ukrainian ground forces.

Ukraine is still awaiting the arrival of F-16 jets provided by the West to break Russia’s air superiority, but their impact remains uncertain.

Clarke believes that Kiev will try to keep Moscow at bay on the three fronts to buy time for the most decisive front: Defense production. The reason is that in a conflict like the one in Ukraine, where industrial capabilities are key, the side that can produce a large quantity of weapons to overpower the opponent for a long time will win.

According to a recent RUSI report, Russia has 470,000 troops in Ukraine and can rotate another 400,000 this year, without further troop mobilization. They have 2,000 tanks in Ukraine and can produce additional 1,500 tanks per year. Russia also plans to have 4 million artillery shells this year.

Russia can certainly sustain a high level of combat activity next year. But based on the RUSI report, Clarke believes Russia’s defense production activities are unlikely to maintain the same output until 2025-2026. This is also the time when Ukraine’s defense production activities will start to have a greater impact.

According to Clarke, this scenario hinges on whether Western countries can enhance their defense production capabilities. “With superior production capabilities, Western powers can support Ukraine this year and escalate pressure in the following two years,” Clarke said. “All the West has to do is fulfill the promises they often repeat.”
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